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Kaplan v. Dutra, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 80 (Dec. 1, 2016) (en banc)1 
 
BANKRUPTCY: PERSONAL INJURY EXEMPTIONS 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court, sitting en banc, reviewed a certified question from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court, determining that under NRS 21.010(1)(u) a debtor is entitled to a personal 
injury exemption of $16,150 for each personal injury claim.  
 
Background  
 
 Prior to filing for bankruptcy, David Kaplan received settlements from two personal 
injury cases.  Upon filing for bankruptcy, under NRS 21.090(1)(u), Kaplan claimed two personal 
injury exemptions, one for each settlement he had received.  
In response to Kaplan’s multiple personal injury exemptions, Allan Dutra, the Chapter 7 
trustee, filed an objection. The bankruptcy court then certified a question to the Nevada Supreme 
Court concerning whether NRS 21.090(1)(u) entitled a debtor to more than one personal injury 
exemption if a debtor experienced more than one personal injury incident.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Pursuant to NRAP 5(a), the Nevada Supreme Court “may answer questions of law 
certified to it by federal courts.”2 However, the Nevada Supreme Court may only do so if the 
answer may determine part of the federal case, controlling Nevada precedent does not exist, and 
answering clarifies a critical question of law.3 Here, the Court determined that the bankruptcy 
court’s question would answer a determinative part of the case, Nevada precedent regarding the 
matter did not exist, and answering would settle an important question of law regarding NRS 
21.090(1)(u). To determine the statute’s meaning, the Court looked to legislative intent, along 
with meaning and public policy.  
 
NRS 21.090(1)(u) is ambiguous 
 
The terms “payments” and “personal injury” both create ambiguity because they both 
have more than one reasonable interpretation. For example, “payments” may refer to multiple 
personal injury payments resulting from aggregated multiple personal injury claims, which 
would limit NRS 21.090(1)(u)’s personal injury exemption to $16,500, regardless of the number 
of incidents. In contrast, “payments” may also refer to multiple independent payments received 
for independent incidents, which would allow for multiple exemptions totaling $16,500 each. To 
clear the foregoing ambiguity, the Court turned to legislative intent.  
 
NRS 21.090(1)(u) provides for multiple personal injury exemptions, on a per-claim basis 
 
																																																						
1  By Hayley J. Cummings. 
2  Savage v. Pierson, 123 Nev. 86, 89, 157 P.3d 697, 699 (2007). 
3  Id.		
 The legislative intent concerning NRS 21.090(1)(u) fails to create clarity. During the 
seventy-second regular session, the Nevada State Legislature amended NRS 21.090 to add the 
personal injury exemption. Without sufficient legislative history evidence to determine intent, 
the Court evaluated reason and public policy.  
 Reason and public policy demonstrate that courts should read NRS 21.090(1)(u) to 
include “multiple personal injury exemptions on a per-claim basis.”4 Because exemption statutes 
are in place to secure a debtor’s livelihood, the courts should “liberally and beneficially” 
interpret such statutes in the debtor’s favor.5  
Moreover, the legislature elaborated on the statute’s policy by stating that the statute’s 
purpose was to provide an injured individual with the basic funds necessary for recovery.6 By 
extension, limiting the exemption to $16,500, regardless of the number of injuries sustained, 
frustrates the statute’s purpose. As more injuries likely lead to a higher cost of recovery, NRS 
21.090(1)(u) must provide for multiple exemptions.  
 
Split of authority  
 
 Though the Nevada Supreme Court bases its opinion on Nevada law and NRS 
21.090(1)(u)’s legislative history, a split of authority exists at a federal level. While 1 U.S.C. § 
522(d)(11)(D) provides for a personal injury exemption in federal bankruptcy cases, federal 
courts are split on whether the statute requires a debtor to one aggregated exemption or multiple 
per-claim exemptions. The Nevada Supreme Court agrees with the In re Comeaux holding, 
which provides for multiple per-claim exemptions.7 To illustrate, where debtors claimed three 
personal injury exemptions, the exemption applied to each personal injury incident because (1) 
courts should construe exemption statutes liberally and in the debtor’s favor; (2) Congress placed 
aggregate limits in other similar statutes, but not in 1 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D); and (3) debtors 
who suffer bodily injury deserve the small protection provided by personal injury exemption 
statutes.8   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Pursuant to NRS 21.090(1)(u), individuals filing for bankruptcy within Nevada may 
claim multiple personal injury exemptions if they have separate personal injury settlements. 
Because the statute’s purpose is to provide funding to support recovery in personal injury cases, 
the Court held that NRS 21.090(1)(u)’s allows for multiple personal injury exemptions on a per-
claim basis.  
																																																						
4  Kaplan, 132 Nev. at *5.  
5		In re Christensen, 122 Nev. 1309, 1314,	149 P.3d 40, 43 (2006).	
6  Hearing on S.B. 70 Before the Assembly Judiciary Comm., 2003 Leg., 72d Sess. 26 (Nev. 2003). 
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